In the literature on the compatibility between the time of our experience and the time of physics, the special theory of relativity has enjoyed central stage. By bringing into the discussion the general theory of relativity, I suggest a new analysis of the misunderstood notion of becoming, developed from hints in Gödel's published and unpublished arguments for the ideality of time. I claim that recent endorsements of such arguments, based on Gödel's own "rotating" solution to Einstein's field equation, fail: once understood in the right way, becoming can be shown to be both mind-independent and compatible with spacetime physics. Being a needed tertium quid between views of time traditionally regarded as in conflict, such a new approach to becoming should also help to dissolve a crucial aspect of the century-old debate between the so-called A and B theories of time.
Introduction: the shift from STR to GTR and the centrality of becoming
In the literature on the relationship between the time of our experience and the time of physics, the special theory of relativity (STR) has curiously but undoubtedly played a major role. On the assumptions that (i) becoming (the "flow of time") is the essential feature of experienced time;
(ii) objective (i.e. mind-independent) becoming presupposes an ontological difference between present and future events or state of affairs;
(iii) the geometrical structure presupposed by STR is a necessary constraint that physical time in general must meet, a solution to the problem of the definability of becoming in Minkowski spacetime has also been regarded as the main way to solve the question of the compatibility between the time of physics and the time of our experience. 2 However, while (i) and (ii) above can be regarded as plausible, (iii) should strike us as suspicious, especially when it is used to claim that if Minkowski spacetime cannot make room for any sort of "ontological difference" mentioned in (ii), then becoming must be considered to be mind-dependent. An endorsement of the truth of the antecedent of this conditional is usually assumed to have consequences also for the philosophy of time one should adopt. For instance, to the extent that a commitment to a mind-independent becoming is regarded as the essential tenet of the so-called A (or "dynamic") theories of time, those of their B ("static") rivals that treat past, present and future events as being ontologically on a par would be vindicated by the geometrical requirements of Minkowski spacetime. 3 On the contrary, if some sort of primitive relation of becoming -appropriately relativized to points or worldlines -could be defined in terms of the structure of Minkowski spacetime, the compatibility between becoming and STR would be demonstrated, and no choice between the A and the B theories of time would be possible only on the basis of physics.
To an unbiased reader, however, such an exclusive worry with STR should appear as puzzling, and in need of a justification. True enough, Minkowski spacetime is the standard, flat spatiotemporal arena for contemporary quantum field theories, but since in the presence of gravitating matter STR does not yield an accurate description of physical reality, it cannot be viewed -as (iii) obviously presupposes -as a fundamental physical theory. Considering that within the general theory of relativity (GTR), STR has only a "tangential" validity, 4 why should we assume that the properties of time that are characteristic of the latter theory also apply to the former? More generally, why should we assume that time has the same properties across different physical theories?
Notably, Weyl [1918, p. 220] , Eddington [1920, p. 163] , Jeans [1936] and Gödel [1949a] were all aware of the fact that the special relativistic limitations vis à vis the absence of a distinguished, global time order can be regarded as a "local phenomenon". In fact, the presence and the actual distribution of matter in the large-scale structure of the universe may «largely destroy the equivalence of different observers, and distinguish some of them from the rest, namely those which follow in their motion the mean motion of matter» (Gödel [1949a (Gödel [ , p. 559/1990 ). Unfortunately, in much of the recent literature such an important point seems to have been lost. 5 One of the main aims of this paper is to redress the balance, by relocating the discussion about becoming and physical time in the more appropriate context of GTR and of cosmological models in general. 6 Besides having being too absorbed by the infinitesimal, "tangential" features of Riemannian spacetimes, I think it is fair to add that the philosophical literature has never yielded a clear and convincing analysis of the rather obscure notion of becoming, something which has contributed to generate a widespread -but, in my opinion, totally ungroundedbelief in the incompatibility between the time of physics and the time of our experience. Such an obscurity has also affected the formulations of the two major theories that have divided the analytic 20 th century philosophy of time. As it is should be clear from the above presentation, I take it that the real contention between the "A" and the "B" theories of time does not concern the truth conditions of tensed sentences (as Faye [1989] and Mellor [1998] have it), or the relational versus the monadic nature of tenses (as Horwich [1987] among others has it).
In spite of the obvious importance of these questions, in the following I will take for granted that the crucial, still open rift between the two camps concerns the nature of change and the mind-independence of becoming. 7 Especially within the recent attempts at grounding a quantum theory of gravity, time seems to have lost the independence it had acquired with respect to change in the complex historical path that led from Plato to Newton (see Smith [2000, p. 928-9] ), and today it seems appropriate to regard the notion of time as being inextricably linked to that of change.
Given the importance of a correct understanding of becoming for this project, I plan to begin by proposing a new analysis of such a notion, to be regarded, on the wake of Gödel [1949a] , simply as the successive occurrence (coming into being) of tenselessly conceived facts or events ( §2). Armed with such a much needed tertium quid between the traditional ontological requirements of the A and the B theories of time, I will then show that both Gödel's argument against the reality of time based on his famous "rotating universes", and its recent reconstructions by Savitt [1994] and Earman [1995] , fail ( §3 and §4). Despite the fact that physics in principle cannot yield a sufficient condition for the tenseless coming into being of events at instants of cosmic time which becoming consists in, I claim that the cosmological model currently adopted by physicists is completely consistent with it and with the requirements of experiential time, once the latter has been correctly explicated. Finally, by
showing that my explication of becoming is faithful to our pre-theoretical intuitions about it and does not run into notorious paradoxes entailed by "the moving now", I conclude with a simple argument in favor of its objectivity ( §5).
The nature of becoming and Gödel's argument for the ideality of time
Gödel's argument against the reality of time, which appeared in Schilpp's volume in honor of Einstein (Gödel [1949a] ), is based on the discovery of a new solution to Einstein's field equation, notoriously encompassing the existence of closed timelike curves (Gödel [1949b] ).
The argument is important not only for the conclusion it -unsuccessfully, as we will seetries to support, but much more for the brilliant analysis of controversial philosophical notions that it provides; from this point of view, it has certainly not received the attention it deserves. 8 Besides Yourgrau's pioneering work on Gödel's philosophy of time [1991, 1999] , which had the great merit of taking into account also Gödel's unpublished material, there are as of now two conflicting reconstructions of Gödel's argument for the ideality of time, Savitt's [1994] which endorses it, and Earman's [1995, pp. 194-200] , which rejects it, and somehow considers it unworthy of much attention.
Part of the neglect of this argument in comparison to the question of time travel, also raised by Gödel's model, can be explained by the fact that Gödel's argument is incomplete and "gappy" to say the least, as it appears to be centered around the cryptic claim that since there is no objective lapse of time in his rotating universe, there is no objective lapse of time in our world either, the main difference between the two models depending only on the way matter is contingently distributed and moves. More specifically, in our universe, unlike Gödel's, matter is not everywhere rotating (as Gödel put it, «the compass of inertia does not rotate around galactic matter»), though the physical laws given by Einstein's equations are the same, as Gödel's model satisfies them. Interestingly, Gödel discovered that the lack of rotation is sufficient to define a global temporal order (see Malament [1995, p. 263] ), since the congruence of worldlines of matter corresponding to the major mass points of the universe can be compared to the strands or the fibers of a rope representing spacetime.
Absence of twisting, which corresponds to null rotation, is sufficient to slice through the rope with a plane which is orthogonal to every fiber of the rope and the collection of all such planes is called "cosmic time".
To philosophers of space and time, it is indeed reassuring to find out that Gödel's interest in general relativity was philosophical in origin, as his mathematical work on time «was spurred by his interest in Kant's philosophy of space and time rather than by his frequent talks with Einstein», which in any case began only in 1942 (Wang [1995] , p. 216). In fact, in his "Lecture on rotating universes " [1990, p. 274 The second remark is that in the published piece [1949a] , he defends also the converse claim that change presupposes an objective lapse of time. These two claims together imply that time is real if and only if a change in the existing is real. This equivalence eliminates the charge of circularity in the first three premises of the argument below, and justifies in particular its first premise (0), which in the published paper has no textual support, but is obviously assumed for the sake of the conclusion about the ideality of time.
Whenever possible, each premise of the argument -whose reconstruction owes much to both Earman's and Savitt's -is supported by textual quotations from Gödel's published work [1949a] . Partial conclusions deduced from previous premises are in bold types:
GÖDEL'S ARGUMENT AGAINST THE REALITY OF TIME
Part I
(0) Time is real only if change is real.
(1) Change is real only if there exists an objective lapse of time.
«change becomes possible only through the lapse of time» (1949a, p. 558/1990, p. 202) (2) Time is real only if there exists an objective lapse of time [from (0) and (1)] (3) «The existence of an objective lapse of time means or at least is equivalent to the fact, that reality consists of an infinity of layers of "now" which come into existence successively» (1949a, p. 558/1990, p. 202) . 
The first part of Gödel's argument
The unanimous opinion of commentators is in favor of the conclusion of part I of the argument, which proves that in Gödel's universe time is ideal, or mind-dependent. However, some of the premises in my reconstruction, which differs from Savitt's and Earman's, might be regarded as controversial.
For instance, and firstly, it could be objected that (1) -and therefore (2) ago: «To "become present" is, in fact, just to "become", in an absolute sense; i.e., to "come to pass" in the Biblical phraseology, or, most simply, to "happen". Sentences like "This water became hot" or "This noise became louder" record facts of qualitative change. Sentences like "This event became present" record facts of "absolute becoming"» [Broad 1938, p. 280] . To counter this first objection to Gödel, it is then important to keep in mind that "change" as used in premise (0) refers to absolute change (absolute becoming) in Broad's sense, to be carefully distinguished from a qualitative change of events losing the (pseudo-attribute of)
"being future" and becoming present.
Secondly, it might be objected that (2) implies the dubious "moving now" conception of time (see Earman [1995] and Savitt [1994, p. 468] ), since it is always possible to ask "how fast does the absolute change in what exists occur?" However, as anticipated earlier, I argue that the claim that instantaneously conceived events (or facts) "come into existence" at a certain time (the "objective lapse of time" in the above argument) is simply equivalent to the claim that they mind-independently occur at that time. Consequently, Gödel's locution "events come into existence successively" should really be read simply as "events (mindindependently) take place one after the other at their time of occurrence".
In a word, as I interpret it, the objective lapse of time or the "change the existing" referred to by Gödel amounts to the rather non-metaphysical, almost self-evident claim that if "event E occurs (or, equivalently, tenselessly exists) at time t", at a later or earlier time t', other events occur (exist) 10 . This means that, at time t', the set of existing events includes events other than those existing at t. With this stipulation, our language regimented in a logical way would have a domain of quantification for each time, containing only those entities that then exist.
To come now to the charge that an objective coming into being, or the "flow (lapse) of time" as it is interpreted here, implies the fallacious "moving now", note that one could simply point out that the absolute change in what exists is no ordinary change, and as such, it does not conceptually depend on other notions as the latter does. 11 The reason why it is simply meaningless to ask "how fast does such a change in the existing occur?" is given by the fact that the notions that are synonymous of becoming or "coming into existence", namely "occurring" or "happening", are not further analyzable; in any case, they don't presupposes a perduring entity and a pair of incompatible properties possessed by the same entity at different times as the qualitative notion of change does. It is only in the ordinary sense of change -the qualitative change of, say, a piece of iron becoming rusted -that one can talk about the rate of change, since any change in time can be slow or fast (a slow aging or rusting, a fast aging or rusting). Of a change of time, one cannot even say that it occursthough it can be regarded it as a feature of the universe quite independent of our mindssince, strictly speaking, it is only events that can occur at times, and their succeeding one another at different times is not an event, if the latter is defined as an instantaneous entity as is customary in relativity.
A third objection a tenseless theorist of time might have against (1) above is that it ignores the tenseless aspect of time. According to the tenseless theorist, events are mindindependently before one another, even though they are given in block, because they don't become, or don't come into being or cease to exist (the block universe). In a word, for certain B theorists like Mellor and Faye, tenseless temporal relations -and therefore, in a sense, time -are real even if the lapse of time usually advocated by the A camp (i.e., the coming into existence of events) is mind-dependent, so that (2) is false.
As a reply to this third criticism, note that even if we changed (2) above by requiring that (2)' Time is real only if the distinction between before and after is mind-independent (objective), a tenseless theorist would still have a harsh destiny in M. Given the existence of closed timelike curves for any point of Gödel's spacetime, an observer whose spatiotemporal carrier coincided with a segment of such curves would have no justification for claiming that beforeness or afterness is mind-independent. Events of type E that she would experience as being before events F, on a closed timelike curve would also be such that F is before E, so that, in such a Gödelian world, temporal betweenness would seem the only objective relation «inhering in events». Consequently, as Kant had it, in Gödel's universe it would be plausible to assume that time as we experience it emerges from the relation of our faculty of perception with the «things in themselves», which established the conclusion of the first part of the argument.
In order to give further arguments in favor of premise (2), it is of paramount importance to keep in mind that when Gödel refers to "time", he always means "the time of our experience", or «what everybody understood by time before relativity theory existed» (1990, manuscript C1, p. 247) . In particular, this implies that, in any case, premise (1) 
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A fourth controversial point of the first part of Gödel's argument might concern the condition of globality: one could object that in the spacetime of general relativity, such a condition may not be necessary to the existence of a lapse of time, and therefore question premise (4) above. One could conceive a local, mind-independent coming into being along single worldlines also in a Gödelian universe, not matched by analogous phenomena at a cosmic scale. Likewise, the absence of an invariant, global time order in STR could be compensated by a worldline-dependent becoming, as is proposed by Clifton and Hogarth [1995] .
In the same fashion, for example, Boltzmann thought that the universe could be in a global state of thermal equilibrium, while some regions, large as a cluster of galaxies, could be characterized by gigantic, rare fluctuations, due to which, for some billions of years, observers would reckon an increase of entropy, and therefore some sort of objectively irreversible phenomena (Boltzmann [1896 (Boltzmann [ -98/1964 ). Would we deny that entropy grows in those regions simply because at a larger scale, both spatially and temporally, the universe is in equilibrium? I doubt it. But then, why can't we say that some sort of local becoming takes place in a mind-independent way?
Gödel would probably object that by admitting a local coming into being, where "local"
here has the same sense it had in Boltzman's "pockets of increasing entropy lasting for eons", we would make a change in the existing -the lapse of time -relative to particular worldlines, i.e., to some possible observers living in a galaxy. And then, he would add: «The concept of existence (...) cannot be relativized without destroying its meaning completely» [1949a 559/1990, 223, fn. 5] .
However, note that if we cannot relativize the concept of existence, an examination of the impact of the special and the general theory of relativity on our ordinary notion of time would be meaningless since, independently of relativistic considerations, such a relativization is implicit in the very idea of a lapse of time even according to Gödel. In our experience, as he wrote, we often assert of the same event that «it exists and it does not exist, at two different instants of time». Furthermore, without such a relativization, we would be subject to some form of McTaggart's paradox about events being present (existent) and non-present (non existent) at the same time. These remarks are of paramount importance, since not only do they entail that a relativization of tenses is necessary, but also that it does not lead us to a view of becoming that is too deflated to be worth having (see Callender [1997, p.118] ).
Elsewhere (Dorato [1995] ), I have argued that there cannot be a future event in an absolute sense, since an event can count as future only relatively to some present event or other, and human existence appears always temporally located and perspectival, that is, experienced at each instant of time from the perspective offered by that instant. Here, let it suffice to say that, beyond the possibility it offers of re-establishing a compatibility with physical time, the main reason why one wants to defend such a perspectival, relational understanding of existence in time is that without it we could not make room and explain our capacity to literally bring about a future event by acting in the present: "making things happen" presupposes that events that are yet to occur and are brought about by our efforts do not (tenselessly) exist relatively to the moment of action. If they did, our action and our experience of passage would be both illusory, and utterly unexplainable.
Granting the possibility of relativizing the concept of existence in this sense, a much more plausible defense of the condition of globality is that, by rejecting it at least in the context of Gödels's spacetime, we would make the lapse of time non-intersubjectively valid: «in whatever way one may assume time to be lapsing there will always exist possible observers to whose experienced lapse of time no objective lapse corresponds (in particular possible observers whose whole existence objectively would be simultaneous)» (Gödel 1949a (Gödel 561/ 1990 13 In view of this peculiarity of Gödel's spacetime, I take that in the context of the argument under discussion it is plausible to grant Gödel's implicit condition of globality, in such a way that an objective lapse of time must be a lapse for all possible observers (worldlines) of the spacetime. In a word, making a reasonable "equation" between a possible observer and a worldline, within Gödel's cosmological model the
objectivity of becoming must imply its intersubjective validity.
We can therefore conclude that if we lived in Gödel's universe, we should be Kantian about time, since both the difference between earlier and later and that between present and future would be mind-dependent.
The second part of Gödel's argument: why the epistemic defense fails
How does the valid conclusion of the first argument impinge on the way we should understand time in our universe, where the distribution of matter is different? There are two possible interpretations of Gödel's argument, an epistemic one and a metaphysical-modal one, pointing to the necessary grounding of cosmic time in the laws of nature. Here I will limit myself to the former interpretation, which is essentially due to Yourgrau [1991] and Savitt [1994] . Not only is this choice motivated by the fact that it has generated more discussion than the latter, but also by the remark that the metaphysical interpretation has unanimously been regarded as being extremely difficult to justify.
Suppose, with Savitt [1994] there is an objective lapse of time in our universe» (Savitt [1994, p. 468] ).
[from 8 and 12] This reconstruction has the undeniable merit of being faithful to the text, as it is probably spells out what Gödel had in mind when he wrote:«if the experience of time can exist without an objective lapse of time, no reason can be given why an objective lapse of time should be assumed at all.» (Gödel [1949a (Gödel [ , p. 561/1990 ).
Such an epistemic interpretation of Gödel's argument had already been anticipated, somewhat more concisely but less perspicuously, by Palle Yourgrau: «Since the actual world is lawlike compossible with the Gödel universe, it follows that our direct experience of time is compatible with its ideality (assuming with Gödel, its ideality in the Gödel universe). But if even direct experience is inadequate to establish the existence of intuitive time -that is, not merely (relativistic) causal or cosmic time, but genuine, successive time that lapses or passes -then nothing further will suffice» (Yourgrau [1991, p. 53] ). In a word, Yourgrau-Savitt's epistemic argument weakens Gödel's attempted conclusion, as it amounts to shifting the burden of proof to the defenders of the reality of the time of our experience.
The latest attempt at an evaluation of the gist of this argument is Earman's, who, in the appendix to the chapter 6 of his [1995] , examines Yourgrau's version as is reported above and rejects it -he does not discuss Savitt [1994] Gödel's argument, she must pick up Savitt's challenge, and discuss his two premises, namely (10) and (11).
Starting with the former, could the experience of the Gödelians be identical to ours? If we grant this point, obviously we deny that there exists a necessary link between what we experience and the structure of objective, cosmic time also in the actual world, and it may seem that Savitt's premise, to a certain extent, simply begs the question. The point, however,
is not that such a premise is question begging, but rather that since the logical and physical possibility of time travel is needed by Savitt for Gödel's universe not to be ruled out a priori, it is certainly available to an antikantian (a realist about time) to claim that it is at least physically possible that the experience of time of the "Gödelians" be very much unlike ours. 14 Savitt might perhaps defend his premise by invoking well-known technological difficulties entailed by time travel. Observers living in Gödel spacetime would presumably share our technological problems concerning the amount of acceleration and fuel needed to voyage into the past (Malament [1985] ), and would not actually be traveling into the past, though it would be physically possible for them to do so. Moreover, we have to keep in mind that Savitt's premise (10) If time travel in this context is a red herring, there is another difficulty that stands in the way of our accepting (10): to say that it physically possible for local observers living in Gödel's spacetime to experience time as we do implies that it is physically possible for such observers to fail to see any trace of the future. This is highly doubtful, however, since it is certainly physically possible for them not to be screened off from causes that are later than their effects, exactly because they live in a universe in each point of which a closed timelike curve can always be found! One can even argue that in Gödel spacetime there must be traces of the future, since even if the Gödelians' psychological arrow is directed along one direction of time, and that direction is picked out as the direction of time, some later events along that direction will have to be regarded as indirectly causing events in the observers' present. So, especially if such observers live along timelike "loops" whose diameter is not very large, 15 we can conclude that their experience of time would be relevantly different from ours, and Savitt's basic premise would have to be abandoned. At this point, he might retort that for observers living on very large causal loops, causes that are later than their effects would be very improbable, and the technological difficulties of traveling into the past might just make their experience indistinguishable from ours.
Leaving to the reader the difficult task of judging who is going to score on this uncertain point, let me strengthen my objection to Savitt's argument by considering that also premise (11) is debatable: is our "direct experience of time" the only argument to believe in the objectivity of the lapse of time? Clearly, an evaluation of this claim depends on how to understand "our experience of time", in particular the ambiguous and vague word "experience". If Savitt means to claim that no argument in defense of an objective coming into existence is ever likely to come from physics ("experience" meant in a very wide sense, encompassing scientific knowledge), I think we must agree, because cosmic time cannot be regarded as sufficient for objective becoming. Furthermore, it is certainly not among physics' aims to yield a distinction between physical systems or entities that are actual at a certain time and systems that are merely possible, and precisely this distinction is needed for becoming Consequently, in his argument "experience" must mean "scientifically untutored experience". However, even in this restricted sense, "experience" can have two interpretations, a broad and a narrow one.
In a broad sense, one could refer to "experience" as it is coded in ordinary language, particularly in those concepts -possibly a priori for the individual but a posteriori for the species -that have been acquired during our evolutionary history and that are tested, say, in experiments within the so-called naive physics. These "concepts" (time included) must possess some sort of adaptive value, in the sense that they must enable us to cope with the environment in a successful way, despite their approximation and possible lack of precision for purposes of the scientific description of the world. If we interpret "experience" in such a broad evolutionary, not purely psychological, sense, we may even grant Savitt's premise (11), by remarking at the same time that the adaptive value of our naive concepts of "object"
and "property" may justify some sort of general, defeasible "folk realism", telling us that such objects and their properties are prima facie real. Rather than calling into question and
"eliminate" what Sellars [1962] used to call "the manifest image" (the world of our experience), we may temporarily adopt its ontology, until conflicts with the "scientific image" force us to abandon it. On this hypothesis, however, why doubt that there is something mind-independent that our experience of time is about, if in our model of the universe no scientific fact is in direct conflict with it? In our universe, unlike Gödel's, one can be a folk realist about becoming since a necessary condition for it -cosmic time -is indeed satisfied. In this line of argument, rather than arguing directly for the reliability of our experience of time, one could begin by defending, indirectly, some sort of folk realism, which would then support in a non-ad-hoc way also our "natural belief" in objective becoming, once conflicts with known physical theories are shown to be absent.
If, on the other hand, "experience" is given a narrower, purely psychological reading, isn't it quite hazardous to deny, at the present moment, that any future philosophical arguments constructed to prove the reality of the lapse of time must fail? For instance, Tooley [1997] has recently given an important argument in favor of the unreality of the future based on causation, not on our "psychological" experience. How can we exclude that forthcoming and more sophisticated arguments will succeed without calling into question our mental set-ups?
In sum, I don't mean to suggest that Savitt's reconstruction of Gödel's argument is not interesting and persuasive, but only that it is not conclusive to establish the mind-dependence of becoming or the ideality of time in the sense of Kant. In the remainder of the paper, I will pick up Savitt's challenge (recall the shift of the burden of proof) by defending the mindindependence of a somewhat "deflated", minimalist and tenseless notion of becoming, which concerns our experience only in the broader, non-psychological sense mentioned above. As we are about to see, such a notion is nevertheless a satisfactory explication of our intuitive notion of time
Becoming as real occurrence of events and facts
My suggestion is to explicate, or rather simply equate becoming with the notion of "taking place" or "occurring", which is also the natural way to understand change in Broad's absolute, non-qualitative sense referred to above:
Def: Becoming is real if and only if events successively and mind-independently take place at their own proper time of occurrence.
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Given that it is non-controversial to grant that for an event to occur at a time just means for it to exist at that time, the task that still remains is to show that the proposed, minimalistic equivalence between 'coming into existence at time t' (Gödel's change) and 'occurring (existing) at that time' captures the essential features of our pre-theoretical intuitions about becoming and the passage of time.
The solution we are after is simple if we identify the lapse of time with the view, dearest to our intuition, that the "present coincides with the existing". By relativizing this claim to a time t, we get that at t only events simultaneous with (present at) t exist, where "existence" is here understood in a relational, tenseless sense, given by "existence at a date/time". Capturing this intuition in our explication of becoming is therefore indispensable to make the latter adequate, and it seems to me that Gödel has understood this essential point better than any other philosopher before or after him. Consider the following, precious but strangely neglected quotation: «For that time elapses and change exists means […] that at any moment of time only a certain portion of the facts composing the world exists objectively (and different portions at different moments)» [Gödel 1995, p. 235] . Provided that the notion of occurring at a certain proper time is mind-independent -why deny that "things occur" and "events happen" without our taking notice of them? -the thesis that only the present exists (even formulated in the relativized way seen above) is sufficient to claim that events and facts come into existence (and cease to exist) mind-independently.
In fact, how can two temporally separated events coexist in a tenseless sense if, at any instant of (cosmic) time t, only events occurring at t exist (at that time)? For any two temporally separated, instantaneous events e and f, the earlier of the two must cease to exist when the other comes into being, provided that "event e comes into being (into existence) at t" (tenseless becoming) simply means "e occurs or happens at t" or "e is present at (simultaneous with) t". By defending such a tenseless and relational view of becoming, one can readily join Williams [1951] in arguing that the flow of time interpreted in a literal sense is inconsistent, because of notorious difficulties with questions like "how fast does the present flow"? Of course, renouncing this view is certainly not a sacrifice, because the explication of becoming proposed here -by broaching this problem we come to the second issue anticipated abovedoes indeed save two essential tenets of the commonsensical view of time:
(i) At any instant of time, only what is present at that time exists, since both the past and the future at that time don't exist (both in the tensed sense of existence,
given by "existing now" and in a perfectly acceptable tenseless sense, given by 'existence at a date/time') 18 ;
(ii) an absolute change in what exists can be regarded as objective, since it coincides with the successive coming into being (occurring) of events either (a)
at different instants of a global, cosmic time, if the latter is indeed available, or (b) at instants of a local, proper time along a particular worldline.
I argue that such a successive coming into being of events at different moments of time is the mind-independent, objective core lying behind the subjective sense of literal passage of one time over another, which, admittedly, is engendered by our memory of events that don't exist any more and our anticipations of events that are yet to happen, fused together in a unique but continuously changing present experience. The changing of such an experience can be explained only with the successive coming into being of events and states of affair at their time of occurrence.
It is in this sense that I think that such a minimalist view of becoming, that in the literature has never been clearly formulated, can be regarded as a tertium quid between, and therefore as a dissolution of, some of the main contentions between the two camps (the "A" and the "B") in which the analytic philosophy of time of the 20th century has been divided: despite the fact that tensed sentences have tenseless truth conditions -as urged by Mellor [1981] and Faye [1989] -becoming must be regarded, contrary to the typical B-theorists' view, as a mind-independent feature of the universe. 19 At any instant of a cosmic or local time, tenselessly conceived events and facts do come into being as objectively as it gets, for the simple reasons that at any instant of time, only events occurring at that instant exist (in the two senses seen above), and such events do not occur all at once, but in succession.
Furthermore, once we realize that it does not make sense to ask how fast events do come into being, because coming into being at t just means occurring at that time and not existing before, the ghost of the infinite regress, imported by misleading metaphors of motion through space of a reified now, vanishes.
Incidentally, we should note that the view that mind-independent occurring (on the part of events) is sufficient for becoming is not completely new, since it has been implicitly defended by authors that are usually identified as arch-enemies of becoming, like Eddington: «events do not happen, they are just there and we come across them» [1920, p. 51) , and Weyl «the objective world simply is, it does not happen» [1949, p. 116] . I claim that these oft-quoted passages, whose true meaning has escaped us, are the only coherent formulations of a becomingless world, i.e., a world in which events literally don't occur, but simply are.
It should be obvious why both Weyl and Eddington defended this view with respect to STR. Given that in this theory the temporal order is only partial, events that are usually defined, as in Kim's theory [1976] , by a triple constituted by a substance, a property and a (coordinate) time, would have to be regarded as having an identity which depends on an arbitrary choice of an inertial frame. In this case, it may appear more plausible to assume, as
Eddington and Weyl did, that events don't occur at all, but simply are, or tenselessly coexist in the block view of the universe. If my reading of those oft-quoted passages is correct, these two philosophers had already realized what I am urging here, namely that for the reality of change and of temporal becoming, the reality of "occurrence" suffices. This, in its turn, implies that as soon as we grant that in a general relativistic spacetime endowed with a global time order events can objectively and mind-independently occur in succession, we thereby introduce a change in what is real at different instants of time for the reasons given above, and therefore a tenseless form of becoming at a cosmic time t. It is certainly more difficult to defend a local, worldline-dependent becoming in the Minkowskian setting, since the present there does not extend in space but must be identified with a point (the "here-now). However, this is the topic for a different paper.
Conclusion
Even if the argument above in favor of becoming were not judged to be conclusive, what matter most for my purpose is that the adoption of a relativized and tenseless notion of becoming yields a coherent alternative to its mind-dependence and to the block view. We can adopt the view from no-when of the block universe, a God's eye point of view, which describes entities that are temporally extended sub specie aeternitatis, or we can resort to a relationist, perspectival description of reality, which refers existence to a particular "point of view" or instant of time. If both are compatible with know physical theories, the choice between them can be only be a matter of overall coherence with what else we know about the universe.
The reasons to prefer the latter view are not only pragmatic, i.e., given by the fact that we If what I am trying to argue is correct, it follows that a somewhat deflated version of objective becoming must be reintroduced, one that is equivalent to the notion that events mind-independently occur at a certain proper time and place. If the proper time of a single, fundamental particle (observer) can be extended to a cosmic time as in standard RobertsonWalker cosmologies, becoming can be regarded as being independent of the varying lapses of time associated to different timelike curves, and, as such, it passes the test of intersubjective validity. If there is a perfectly legitimate sense in which physical events belonging to any relativistic spacetime (also Minkowski's) exist only at their proper time and place of occurrence -no interpretation of relativity forces us to abandon this trivially simple remark -it should be clear why this view of becoming entails some sort of rapprochement between the so-called static view of time and the dynamic view: the only existing facts are tenseless (facts at times) but their becoming or coming into being at instants of cosmic or local time is a real, though physically unexplainable feature of the universe.
